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SPLITTING THE BABY: AVOIDING 
FORECLOSURE WHEN HOMEOWNERS HAVE 
UNCERTAIN OR CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
DANIEL BAHLS* 
And the king said, “[d]ivide the living child in two, and give half to 
the one, and half to the other.”  Then the woman whose son was alive 
said to the king, because her heart yearned for her son, “Oh, my lord, 
give her the living child, and by no means slay it.”  But the other 
said, “[i]t shall be neither mine nor yours; divide it.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Cleaving an infant in twain results in a substantial loss of utility for 
both the baby and those who hold it dear.2  The threat of forcing such a 
result can give one party an extraordinary and inequitable amount of 
control over another.  As the story illustrates, this result should be 
avoided whenever possible.3  An analogous, albeit less gruesome, 
problem arises where one party is threatened with the loss of a home and 
the shelter it provides through foreclosure due to the concern that a co-
owner might lose a trivial amount of home equity.  Preventing 
foreclosure can avert significant losses to homeowners, their families, 
lenders, and the surrounding community.4  This Article explores how 
homeownership can be preserved in cases where a homeowner is not 
able to secure the full cooperation of all borrowers on the account.5  This 
 
* Daniel Bahls is an attorney in Western Massachusetts serving indigent clients 
facing foreclosure.  The author would like to thank Marge Kennard, Joshua Gutierrez, Carolyn 
Dekker, and Laura Gal for helpful feedback through the process of drafting this Article. 
1. 1 Kings 3:25-26 (Rev. Standard Version). 
2. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 135, 154 (1991). 
3. See 1 Kings 3:27 (Rev. Standard Version). 
4. See, e.g., Daniel Bahls & Katherine Hunt, Abhorring a Forfeiture: The Importance of 
Equitable Jurisdiction in a Foreclosure Crisis, 41 STETSON L. REV. 779, 782 (2012). 
5. For the purpose of this Article, the term “owner” is used expansively to include any 
and all title claimants, even if a formal interest in the estate is incomplete.  For example, if a 
home is a marital asset in a contested divorce, this Article considers both spouses “owners” 
even if only one spouse is on the deed.  Similarly, an heir or devisee would be considered an 
owner even if a probate process is incomplete.  By contrast, a “borrower” is used to refer to a 
person who is named as the account holder of the lender (i.e. the person who borrowed the 
money, whether or not that person still owns the house). 
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includes cases where one co-owner wants to retain a home but is 
hampered by another co-owner who is unresponsive, uncooperative, or 
even openly hostile, as well as cases where an owner claiming title is not 
the original borrower on the account. 
Avoiding preventable foreclosure has become a common theme for 
lenders, consumer advocates, and policymakers.6  Finding alternatives to 
foreclosure has been difficult, even in the best of circumstances.7  Past 
scholarship has explored conflicts of interest between the various lender-
side entities and suggested ways to promote foreclosure alternatives 
despite these conflicts.8  Thus far, insufficient attention has been given to 
avoiding foreclosure where homeowners are similarly unable to speak 
with a clear and united voice. 
Part I of this Article begins with a brief survey of the foreclosure 
prevention landscape and the relatively recent changes that have altered 
the calculus of when foreclosure can be averted.  It reviews existing 
literature on situations where internal conflicts on the lender’s side 
prevent or inhibit foreclosure avoidance. 
Part II addresses the circumstances in which borrowers might be 
unable to present a united front in negotiations with the lender.  This 
section includes a discussion of why these problems are of particular 
societal concern and why, in many cases, the most equitable result 
requires one owner or the other to retain ownership of the property.  
Finally, Part II discusses the cases of special concern where domestic 
abusers try to force a home into foreclosure as an extension of a pattern 
of abuse and control. 
Part III of this Article will address the mechanics that make 
foreclosure prevention particularly challenging where full cooperation 
from all borrowers or owners cannot be secured. 
Part IV begins with a discussion of partial solutions that advocates, 
judges, or other interested parties may be able to use to solve or avoid 
problems with existing law and prevailing policies.  It will also highlight 
specific policies that lenders could change to resolve these problems in 
mutually beneficial ways.  Part V argues that the diverse rights and 
interests of parties involved in a mortgage foreclosure cannot be 
 
6. See, e.g., Heather Scheiwe Kulp & Jennifer Shack, A (Mortgage) Crisis in 
Communication: Foreclosure Dispute Resolution As Effective Response?, 66 ARK. L. REV. 
185, 186 (2013); Geoff Walsh, The Finger in the Dike: State and Local Laws Combat the 
Foreclosure Tide, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 139, 158 (2011). 
7. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in 
Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 624 (2009). 
8. See, e.g., Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives 
Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755, 802 (2011). 
DANIEL BAHLS  
2014] SPLITTING THE BABY 263 
adequately protected without joining all interested parties in one judicial 
action.  The stakes are too high for non-judicial foreclosure. 
I.  FORECLOSURE, HOME PRESERVATION, AND NON-COOPERATIVE 
BORROWERS 
A. Avoiding Foreclosure in 2014 
Due to the wide expansion of foreclosure alternatives over the past 
six years, a foreclosure requires two failures.  First, a borrower fails to 
make some payment that the lender believes is due.9  Second, the lender 
and borrower must fail to arrive at some alternative to foreclosure.10  
Although this Article focuses on preserving homeownership, foreclosure 
alternatives such as short-sales or deeds-in-lieu are similarly more 
efficient than foreclosure.11 
Because state law governs the foreclosure process,12 the precise 
timeline and process varies significantly from state to state.13  Some 
states require a court judgment for a foreclosure while other states 
require no judicial process.14  Responses by state legislatures have 
similarly varied.15  Claims and defenses available to homeowners 
opposing foreclosure and resources available to struggling homeowners 
 
9. See, e.g., Security Instruments: Form 3022: Massachusetts Mortgage, Freddie Mac, ¶ 
22, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html (last visited May 13, 
2014). 
10. See generally Grace B. Pazdan, How Foreclosure Mediation Legislation Can Keep 
Vermonters in Their Homes (and Money in the Pockets of Mortgage Holders), 36 VT. B.J. 24, 
25 (Spring 2010) (discussing foreclosure alternatives and common barriers to reaching them in 
mediation); Samuel C. Waters, A View from the Trenches: The Legal Practitioner and Loss 
Mitigation, 60 S.C. L. REV. 807, 808 (2009) (noting that the cost of foreclosure exceeds that of 
“any alternative to foreclosure”). 
11. Zachary T. Brumfield, The “Short Cut” to the Stabilization of the Underwater 
Housing Market: How the New FHFA Short Sale Guidelines Promote Economic Efficiency, 
41 REAL EST. L.J. 456, 457 (2013); Stephen F.J. Ornstein et al., Eligibility and Foreclosure 
Alternatives in the HAMP Home Affordable Refinancing and Foreclosure Alternatives 
Programs, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 415, 419 (2010).  
12. Mabry v. Super. Ct., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201, 217 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2010); Lydia 
Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized Housing 
Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1894 (2013). Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 and 
OHIO REV. CODE § 2323.07. 
13. Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the 
Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 587 (2010). 
14. Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and 
Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 305 (1993).  
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 35A-35C; Brandon Rehkopf, Comment, Saving the 
American Dream in Ohio: Crafting Incentives and Disincentives to Promote a Responsible 
Foreclosure Process, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 437, 450 (2012) (discussing Ohio’s amendments to 
its Consumer Sales Practices Act regulating mortgage origination—but exempting state and 
national banks). 
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likewise differ from state to state.16 
Despite these state-by-state variations, the desire to avoid 
unnecessary17 foreclosure has been nearly universal.  In a foreclosure, 
homeowners lose both a home, and, in most cases, any accumulated 
home equity.  Lenders and investors take a significant financial hit 
through the reduced value of the collateral, the costs of the foreclosure 
itself, and costs associated with carrying and offloading distressed 
properties.18  Communities are harmed through lost tax revenue, 
increased crime, reduced property values,19 and a plethora of issues 
associated with high rates of foreclosed or vacant properties.20  Due to 
the overwhelming need to address the foreclosure crisis, many states and 
localities have implemented special legislation or programs to address 
the issues.21 
The best known and most common foreclosure avoidance programs 
are loan modification efforts such as the Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP).22  The goal of such programs is to use a combination 
 
16. See, e.g., Hardest Hit Foreclosure Initiative, NAT’L COUNS. OF ST. HOUSING 
AGENCIES, https://www.ncsha.org/advocacy-issues/hardest-hit-foreclosure-initiative (last 
visited May 13, 2014) (describing a federal commitment of $7.6 billion to different proposals 
by different state housing finance agencies in eighteen states and the District of Columbia).  
The resources are not available in other jurisdictions. 
17. Much effort has been spent on avoiding “unnecessary” foreclosure—though little 
has been written on what constitutes a “necessary” foreclosure.  For the purpose of this 
Article, a “necessary” foreclosure will be a foreclosure where 1) the foreclosing entity can 
anticipate a substantially larger recovery from foreclosure than from any achievable 
alternative to foreclosure once all costs, including reputational costs, are taken into account, or 
2) a property has been abandoned by a borrower for reasons unrelated to the threat of an 
unnecessary foreclosure.  
18. Waters, supra note 10, at 808 (noting an average investor loss of 30% to 60% of the 
outstanding balance of the loan). 
19. Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Peter Smith & Wei Li, Collateral Damage: The 
Spillover Costs of Foreclosures, CTR FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/collateral-damage.pdf 
(estimating a total reduction in property values of $1.95 trillion caused by proximity to 
foreclosed homes). 
20. Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory 
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1315 
(2006); Bahls & Hunt, supra note 4, at 79. 
21. Walsh, supra note 6, at 158. 
22. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is one of many loan 
modification programs.  Other programs such as proprietary modifications or modifications 
pursuant to the National Mortgage Settlement tend to roughly mirror the terms of the HAMP 
modifications.  The detailed guidelines for HAMP are laid out in the Making Home 
Affordable Handbook for Non-GSE Servicers.  U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: HANDBOOK FOR NON-GSE MORTGAGES (version 4.3, 2013) 
[hereinafter “U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY”], available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/pr 
ograms/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_43.pdf.  Fannie Mae’s version of HAMP is 
included in Section 609 of the FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 2012 SERVICING GUIDE (2012), 
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of interest-rate decreases, term extensions, and principle forgiveness or 
forbearance to reduce the monthly payment of a loan to something a 
borrower can afford while ensuring that the lender comes out ahead of 
where the lender would had it simply pursued foreclosure.23  Because 
HAMP has been a model for foreclosure prevention, the strengths and 
weaknesses of its particular directives are likely to redound across the 
industry as a whole. 
B. Lender-Side Challenges to Home Preservation 
Loan modification is challenging even in the best of circumstances.  
Servicers24 frequently lose documents,25 request the wrong documents,26 
or over represent the probability of a loan modification to borrowers.27  
Servicers have been unable or unwilling to invest in competent staff to 
address the problem.28  The application process has been plagued by 
uncertainty and prolonged delays.29  This uphill fight for struggling 
borrowers is partially a consequence of perverse incentives favoring 
foreclosure to other resolutions.30 
Part of the challenge arose from the reality that the mortgagee was 
no longer the unified entity many programs assumed it to be.31  The 
servicer, investor, mortgagee, and originator of any given mortgage are 
frequently separate entities.32  If the foreclosure process advances and a 
 
available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc031412.pdf (last visited May 13, 
2014).  Freddie Mac’s version of HAMP is included in the FREDDIE MAC SINGLE-FAMILY 
SELLER/SERVICER GUIDE (Volume 2, C65, updated June 14, 2013). 
23. John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: An Overview of the Program and 
Recent Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 194, 196 (2011). 
24. Mortgage Servicers are the entities responsible for communicating with and 
collecting payments from borrowers and distributing those payments to investors, hazard 
insurers, and taxing authorities.  The decision of when and whether to foreclose is usually also 
handled by the servicer.  Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 1898.  
25. Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 1901. 
26. Kulp & Shack, supra note 6, at 220. 
27. Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the 
Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 727, 773 (2010). 
28. Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank, Preemption, 
and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 171, 178 (2011) 
(citing a leaked Consumer Financial Protection Bureau estimate suggesting that mortgage 
servicers stood to save $20 billion by inadequately staffing loss-mitigation efforts); Waters, 
supra note 10, at 814 (identifying staffing concerns and the presence of offshore call centers 
that “offer little assistance in loan resolution”).  
29. Braucher, supra note 27, at 773. 
30. Thompson, supra note 8. 
31. Thompson, supra note 8, at 764; Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 1890. 
32. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing 
Crisis, 93 B.U. L. REV. 389, 400 (2013). 
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law firm is charged with completing a foreclosure, the entry of the 
foreclosure firm adds yet another player to the mix.  The entity charged 
with making a decision on whether foreclosure is a good idea in any 
given situation is often a computer program.33  The interactions of the 
investor and homeowner, the ultimate stakeholders, are filtered through a 
mortgage servicer that may have structural incentives against assisting 
these stakeholders in reaching a mutually beneficial arrangement.34  
Servicers have been less likely to modify mortgages serviced on behalf 
of an outside investor than they have been to modify loans held in their 
own portfolio.35  Restrictions regarding timing or permissible ways to 
modify loans placed on servicers by investors can further limit the ability 
of servicers to avert foreclosure, even where this is in the investor’s 
financial interests.36  Changing restrictions in servicing agreements may 
require the unanimous consent of an impossibly large group of 
investors.37  The investors themselves have disparate interests and 
incentives, depending on the seniority of the tranches they hold.38 
Even communications from the same company can be disjointed 
and inconsistent.39  In some instances, one employee of a servicer will 
direct a borrower to stop making payments in order to receive help while 
another employee in another department determines that the borrower 
does not qualify and initiates foreclosure proceedings.40  As a result, 
mortgage servicers often press forward with foreclosure, even where a 
 
33 In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 627 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d, No. 09-cv-2479-JF, 
2010 WL 624909 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 274 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
34. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 70 
(2011). 
35. Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 752 (2013). 
36. Margaret R.T. Dewar, Comment, Regulation X: A New Direction for the Regulation 
of Mortgage Servicers, 63 EMORY L.J. 175, 187 (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 
22, at ch. 2, § 1.3. 
37. Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski, A New Proposal for 
Loan Modifications, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 419 (2009). 
38. McCoy, supra note 35, at 764.  McCoy concludes that the “tranche warfare” 
problem is not likely a primary barrier to loan modification.  It may, however, contribute to 
the lower modification rates of private-label securitized loans.  Id. 
39. Robert G. Gibson, Advising Distressed Homeowners, DCBA BRIEF (Feb. 2011) at 
24, available at http://www.dcbabrief.org/flipbook/0211/index.html.  Judge Gibson identifies 
“Kafkaesque bureaucracy as well as lender understaffing, employee turnover, and/or 
incompetence at the frontline” as impediments to borrowers seeking loan modifications.  Id. 
40. Amy B. Parker, Note, Mending Broken Promises: Allowing Homeowners to Pursue 
Claims of Promissory Estoppel Against Lenders When Denied Loan Modifications, 47 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 985, 985 (2013); see also Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 
336, 339 (D. Mass. 2011) (discussing a homeowner’s allegation that Wells Fargo instructed a 
borrower who was current on a loan to stop making payments on the loan in anticipation of 
modification, failed to review the borrower for a modification, and began foreclosure 
proceedings). 
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loan modification is in the best interests of both the homeowners and the 
investors who ultimately own the debts.41 
Increasingly aggressive efforts to get the parties to come to the 
same table and work out the problem have been an ongoing theme in 
legislative foreclosure-prevention efforts.42  Homeowners and their 
advocates often struggle to identify who on the lender’s side has 
authority to modify a loan.43  Attorneys retained to conduct a foreclosure 
sale rarely have any authority beyond collecting information to send to a 
contact at the servicer.  The contact at the servicer rarely has any 
authority beyond determining whether a packet of information is 
complete and sending it to another department.  Communication 
breakdowns can and do occur at every step of the process. 
As the foreclosure crisis has stretched on and more options have 
become available, the modification landscape has improved.  This may 
have to do with increased experience for the servicers.  It may have to do 
with greater staffing relative to the need.  It almost certainly has to do 
with aggressive monitoring following the forty-nine state settlement.44  
However, as this Article will argue, requests for loan modifications are 
usually denied.  The homeowners are not able to act with a united front 
with full and unquestionable authority to modify the mortgage. 
C. Subordinate Lien Holders 
The presence of a subordinate lienholder can interfere with efforts 
to avoid foreclosure.45  The presence of a second lien could also interfere 
with foreclosure alternatives such as a refinance, short-sale, or deed-in-
lieu.46  Second mortgages also complicate efforts to modify loans.47 
Often both the first and second liens are serviced by the same 
entity—but owned by different investors.48  The conflict escalates where 
a borrower can afford to pay one, but not both, mortgages.49  A first 
lienholder has little incentive to modify a loan in order to give a 
 
41. Eggert, supra note 28, at 173. 
42. Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 1908. 
43. Waters, supra note 10, at 815. 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of America Corp, Settlement Term Sheet, Case 
1:12-cv-00361-RMC, A-17 (D.C. Dist. 2012), available at https://www.mortgageoversight.co 
m/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Servicing-Standards.pdf. 
45. Vicki Been, Howell Jackson & Mark Willis, Essay: Sticky Seconds—the Problems 
Second Liens Pose to the Resolution of Distressed Mortgages, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 71, 95 
(2012). 
46. Id. at 84. 
47. McCoy, supra note 35, at 768. 
48. McCoy, supra note 35, at 768. 
49. Mayer et al., supra note 37, at 419. 
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borrower more income to allocate to a lower-priority loan.50  Servicers 
following vaguely-written servicing requirements may insist that second 
liens be re-subordinated any time the first lien is modified—not because 
the law requires them to do so but because they believe that an investor 
requires this extra hurdle.51  A second lienholder has no incentive to 
agree to a modification that extinguishes the second lien.  Often the 
servicer is also the second investor, which can create conflicting 
incentives.52 
The presence of second liens also contributes to homeowner 
confusion.  Often borrowers will have first and second mortgages on the 
same property, serviced by the same company.  Borrowers who seek 
assistance recount being told that the first lien cannot be modified 
because of the second, and that the second lien cannot be modified until 
the first is addressed.  Because second liens are often smaller, some 
borrowers will dutifully continue to remit payments on a second lien, 
even as the first lienholder has begun foreclosure proceedings. 
II.  NON-UNIFIED BORROWERS 
This Article argues that just as homeowners have, out of necessity, 
dealt with the fractured and confusing realities of the contemporary 
mortgage market, the lenders should work with borrowers, even where 
the borrowers present a similarly disjointed or inconsistent front.  Even 
in cases where the ultimate solution to the conflict involves the 
homeowners leaving the property, there are likely to be foreclosure 
alternatives that work better for all parties.  As discussed in Section III, 
below, loan modification becomes nearly impossible if all owners are 
unable or unwilling to present a united front.  Because foreclosure is 
often preceded by triggering events such as the death or incapacity of a 
homeowner or a divorce,53 it is not surprising that foreclosure cases 
frequently include contested titles to the home and disagreements 
regarding how a delinquency should be addressed. 
A. When Homeowners Are Not Unified 
Problems arise when a homeowner submits an application for 
assistance with a mortgage loan and the lender determines that the name 
 
50. Mayer et al., supra note 37, at 419. 
51. Been et al., supra note 45, at 97. 
52. McCoy, supra note 35, at 768. 
53. See, e.g., Christopher Tarver Robertson, Richard Egelhof & Michael Hoke, Get 
Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 
86 (2008). 
DANIEL BAHLS  
2014] SPLITTING THE BABY 269 
or names on the application do not match the name or names on its 
account.54  The maker or makers of a mortgage note may not be the 
owner or owners of the real estate securing that note, perhaps because 
the current owner of the home is a child or surviving spouse of a 
deceased account-holder.  The successor in ownership and successor 
mortgagee may be different than the original borrower. 
Alternatively, two joint-borrowers might have conflicting intentions 
regarding the debt or the property.  One co-borrower may be unwilling 
to participate in efforts to save the home—usually after a divorce or 
other separation.  Divorce is another of the most common triggers of 
foreclosure.55  An initial default could be triggered by a lack of 
household income prior to the entry of a final divorce judgment, because 
homeowners undergoing divorce may be pre-occupied with matters other 
than the mortgage, or, in some cases, because the homeowner occupying 
the house has less experience paying bills. 
Cases involving both domestic violence and potential foreclosure 
are an area of particular concern.  Pressure to speak to the mortgage 
servicer with one voice could exacerbate violence or be used by an 
abuser as another way to control a victim.56  Although anecdotal 
evidence abounds, it is difficult to pin precise numbers to the overlap 
between domestic violence and foreclosure.  A 2008 study found that 
slightly over half of a surveyed set of domestic violence survivors 
reported either an eviction or foreclosure.57  The same study found that 
54 percent of respondents reported that a lease or mortgage had been in 
the abuser’s name only.58  Due to the safety concerns of that study, 
detailed data is hard to obtain.59 
Divorce and domestic violence are not the only cases where 
borrowers might have substantial disagreements over how to handle the 
property.  Separated or unmarried couples may also disagree on what to 
do with a jointly owned home.  A contested probate or contested 
bankruptcy could lead to a similar result. 
 
54. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2009 Mortgagee Letter 09-23, 
available at http://portal.hud.gov/huddoc/09-23mlatach.doc (last visited May 13, 2014).  
55. See, inter alia, Robertson et al., supra, note 53, at 86. 
56. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, 27 NCLC REPORTS: BANKRUPTCY 
AND FORECLOSURES EDITION 15 (Jan./Feb. 2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/p 
df/domestic_violence/nclc-rpts-bankr-jan-feb-2009.pdf. 
57. Adrienne E. Adams, Cris M. Sullivan, Deborah Bybee, & Megan R. Greeson, 
Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 563, 577 
(2008), available at http://www.wbg.org.uk/GBA_Present_2_2951060362.pdf. 
58. Id. 
59. Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 
100 CALIF. L. REV. 951, 969 (2012). 
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Contacting a co-owner may be difficult or impossible.  A co-owner 
might have moved out of the state without a forwarding address and 
abandoned the home.  Unmarried couples may have broken up without 
dividing the house and largely lost contact with each other.  A 
homeowner who dies intestate may have potential heirs who cannot be 
easily contacted or would need to be served by publication.  This process 
could take a very long time.  If the claimants seeking to save the home 
are not represented by counsel, it could be functionally impossible. 
It is also common for lenders to move forward with foreclosure 
where a homeowner dies and the lender declines to identify and 
communicate with the new owner.  Following the death of a borrower, 
lenders frequently refuse to communicate with successor homeowners.  
The Attorney General of New Mexico recently settled a case where 
Green Tree Servicing was accused of fraudulently having itself 
nominated as the personal representative of the estates of deceased 
borrowers, even when Green Tree knew how to locate surviving spouses 
or children.60  In ABN AMRO Mortgage Group Inc. v. McGahan, the 
Illinois Supreme Court found that a mortgage foreclosure was a quasi in 
rem action and thus needed to be brought against a personal 
representative of an estate rather than, as certain lenders had previously 
done, against the property itself with no required notice to heirs.61  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court rightly noted that a foreclosure 
judgment in Illinois was binding only against the parties joined in the 
suit.62 
Although Federal law prohibits acceleration of a mortgage based on 
a transfer on death to a relative,63 some lenders have sent borrowers in a 
circle where they would not modify the loan until it was assumed, would 
not consider a loan assumed until it was current, and would not consider 
a loan current until it was modified.  Although recent changes in HAMP 
Guidelines attempt to address this issue by directing servicers to process 
modifications and assumptions simultaneously,64 it is too early to 
determine whether this will be successful.  Guidelines for the Home 
Affordable Modification Program also provide servicers some discretion 
to “use good business judgment” in “determining whether to accept a 
 
60. Press Release, Office of New Mexico Attorney General, Mortgage Lender Accused 
of Foreclosing on Deceased: AG Stops Practice by Green Tree Servicing in New Mexico 
(May 6, 2013), available at http://www.nmag.gov/News?place=msg%2Fnews-list%2FBSlO2 
pIFpTc%2Fj8cvZ6a8k18J. 
61. ABN AMRO Mortg. Group, Inc. v. McGahan, 931 N.E.2d 1190, 1198 (Ill. 2010). 
62. Id. at 1197. 
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j–3(d)(5) (1983). 
64. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 8.8. 
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document without a co-borrower’s signature,” in cases such as mental 
incapacity, military deployment, or contested divorce, but offer no 
further guidance.65 
B. The Interests and Motivations of Homeowners 
Balancing and protecting the divergent interests of homeowners 
requires an understanding of those interests.  A home can be a financial 
asset, a source of shelter, and a piece of personal or family history.  A 
home loan contributes both to current debt and to future 
creditworthiness.  None of the many interests homeowners have in a 
home and mortgage should be ignored or understated. 
1. Financial Interests 
A home may be the largest asset of its owners.66  Where one 
borrower wants to sell the house to liquidate any equity and the other 
does not, the borrower wishing to sell may have a very compelling 
reason to push for a sale.  If there is $300,000 of equity in the home, one 
owner might wish to sell while the other owner wishes to maintain 
ownership in order to live in the home.  Unless the owner wishing to 
retain the home has the assets to buy the other owner out, it is probably 
unreasonable to ask one owner to forgo $150,000 for the sake of the 
other’s housing preference. 
Because foreclosed properties sell at a fraction of fair market 
value,67 averting foreclosure has substantial financial benefits for both 
homeowners and lenders.  Failure to cooperate in efforts to avert 
foreclosure has been held to constitute dissipation of a marital asset.68  It 
is highly unlikely that a loan modification with an interest rate reduction 
will materially detriment the interests of a co-owner, even if substantial 
past-due interest is capitalized.69 
 
65. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 5.7. 
66. Martha F. Davis, Comment, The Marital Home: Equal or Equitable Distribution?, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1097 (1983). 
67. Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale Risk: 
Class, Race, and the “Double Discount”, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 609 (2010). 
68. Lewis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse that Dissipates Property Available for 
Equitable Property Distribution: A Suggested Analysis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 112 (1991); J. 
Thomas Oldham, “Romance Without Finance Ain’t Got No Chance”: Development of the 
Doctrine of Dissipation in Equitable Distribution States, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL 
LAWS. 501, 509 (2008) (citing Porath v. Porath, 855 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)); 
Richard W. Zuckerman, Dissipation of Marital Assets in Illinois: A Review, 91 ILL. B.J. 440, 
444 (2003). 
69. See Been, Jackson & Willis, supra note 45, at 83 n.41 (discussing the improbability 
that a loan modification could materially prejudice a second lienholder).  A similar analysis 
applies to loan modification and joint-owners.  Any amount capitalized already constituted a 
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Of course, if a mortgage is delinquent and a foreclosure could be 
imminent, there may not be adequate time to optimally market the 
property.  This is doubly true if the property is not in optimal condition.  
A realtor’s commission will take another chunk out of any anticipated 
proceeds.  Until the housing market substantially improves, many 
properties facing foreclosure will have a relatively low expected payout 
at sale.  A homeowner’s financial stake in the home may be less 
significant than the other interests. 
2. Shelter, Safety, and Non-Economic Concerns 
The value of a home far exceeds its fair market price.70  Unlike 
financial assets, a home is a shelter.71  A roof keeps out the rain.  A 
sturdy lock keeps out the neighbors.  Homeowners may have nowhere to 
go after foreclosure, particularly where monthly rental payments are 
higher than monthly mortgage payments.72  Home preservation is an 
important element of avoiding displacement or community disruption 
and protecting homeowners with children whose health or education 
could be substantially harmed by an avoidable relocation.73  A home is 
also an inextricable element of personal identity and community 
belonging.74  Scholarship has connected homeownership with increased 
happiness and life satisfaction75 and the loss of homeownership with 
increased mortality.76  Lost home equity, while more easily quantified, is 
only a portion of what homeowners lose in foreclosure.  Initiatives to 
 
debt secured by the mortgage.  While capitalization could result in a higher interest-bearing 
principal, a reduction in the interest-rate is almost certain to lead to a net-reduction in future 
interest, despite the increased principal balance.  For capitalization-only modifications where 
the interest rate remains the same, a second owner or second lienholder could be materially 
prejudiced as this permits the holder of the second lien to compound interest by collecting 
interest on the past-due amounts. 
70. Davis, supra note 66, at 1097 (citing Duke v. Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152 (1980)); 
see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991 (1982) 
(describing a home as “a moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of association”).  
But cf. Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (2009).  
71. Melissa B. Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 511, 
520 (2010) (identifying shelter as an important goal of foreclosure law reform and noting a 
curious absence of such an obvious issue from previous scholarship). 
72. Jed Kolko, Buying Cheaper Than Renting Til Mortgage Rates Hit 10.5%, TRULIA 
TRENDS (June 12, 2013), http://trends.truliablog.com/2013/06/mortgage-rates-rent-vs-buy/. 
73. Jacoby, supra note 71, at 522.  
74. Davidson, supra note 32, at 425. 
75. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of 
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2277 n.79 (2008). 
76. Richard R. Daugherty, Will North Carolina’s Predatory Home Lending Act Protect 
Borrowers from the Vulnerability Caused by the Inadequacy of Federal Law?, 4 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 569, 569 n.3 (2000). 
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prevent foreclosure should consider the entirety of the cost of a lost 
home. 
Concerns about shelter and safety become more complicated when 
a history of domestic violence makes the property an unsafe place.77  
Hazardous or unsafe conditions in a home might also mean that 
preserving ownership and occupancy may not be in the best interests of a 
client. 
3. Credit Scores 
A foreclosure has a very negative impact on credit scores and 
remains on a credit report for seven years.78  Short sales or deeds-in-lieu 
are comparably devastating to credit histories.79  While a loan 
modification will still affect credit history, HAMP guidelines include 
special credit reporting requirements to reduce the impact and duration 
of a loan modification.80  If an account was seriously delinquent for a 
prolonged period, it is unlikely to recover quickly.  As a practical matter, 
many borrowers nearing foreclosure have numerous delinquent 
obligations.  Many have also filed bankruptcy.  Where substantial credit 
damage has already been done, the marginal difference in potential 
credit impact between various workout options may have a negligible 
effect on a homeowner’s overall creditworthiness. 
Of course, a failed attempt to modify a loan can prolong a 
delinquency and delay the ability of borrower’s credit scores to recover.  
If borrowers are seeking to move on and rebuild, they may have an 
interest in resolving the matter with the house quickly in hopes of having 
a clean credit report more quickly.  If one borrower seeks to modify the 
loan and keep the house, this must be weighed against the other 
borrower’s interest in a complete break.  On the other hand, if one 
borrower has an opportunity and a desire to mitigate credit damage 
through modification, the other borrower may not have a right to force a 
more complete, serious default and foreclosure.  A lender may decline to 
foreclose and continue reporting an account as seriously delinquent over 
and beyond the life of a thirty-year mortgage. 
 
77. See generally Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 15. 
78. See, e.g., Credit Report Q&A: How Long Will a Foreclosure Affect My FICO 
Score?, MYFICO http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/questions/foreclosure-fico-score-
affect.aspx (Listing foreclosure as “a very negative event”) (last visited May 7, 2014).  
79. Joan Gaskin, Research Looks at How Mortgage Delinquencies Affect Scores, 
BANKING ANALYTICS BLOG (Mar. 24, 2011) http://bankinganalyticsblog.fico.com/2011/03/re 
search-looks-at-how-mortgage-delinquencies-affect-scores.html. 
80. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 12.2. 
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4. Finality 
A joint-borrower may legitimately hope for the finality that a 
foreclosure would bring.  Some borrowers might be more comfortable 
with the certainty of a quick foreclosure followed by an effort to rebuild 
than with the uncertainty of a prolonged loss-mitigation process over 
which they have little control. 
In cases of domestic violence, a final separation of the legal 
interests of the parties may be particularly pressing.  Maintaining the 
connection with the house might increase a chance of further abuse.81 
5. Privacy 
Foreclosure prevention frequently requires homeowners to submit 
extensive financial information.  The same information, of course, would 
need to be disclosed in a divorce or bankruptcy.  Owners of a house have 
an interest in knowing the status of a mortgage securing the property.  
They also have an interest against broad or unnecessary disclosure of 
their personal information.  This is particularly critical in cases involving 
domestic violence where the safety of one owner could be compromised 
by an unauthorized release of information or where inadequate privacy 
protections could lead to identity theft.82  This concern may be greater in 
cases where parties are not already required to disclose financial 
information to each other as part of a divorce proceeding. 
C. Motivations That Do Not Require Special Legal Protection 
1. Abuse and Control 
Too often, domestic violence survivors also face foreclosure.83  The 
stress of the foreclosure process can trigger—or at least exacerbate—
domestic violence.84  Alternatively, if an abuser is removed from the 
home, the corresponding loss of income could render the survivor unable 
to continue paying the mortgage without a loan modification.85  Even if 
the survivor has sufficient income to make the mortgage payment, a 
pattern of financial abuse could cause a borrower to not know how far 
 
81. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 15. 
82. See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 59, at 978. 
83. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 15;  Camille 
Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving Forward in Lawyering 
and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 265-66 (2011). 
84. See Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Take an Emotional Toll on Many 
Homeowners, USA TODAY (May 14, 2008, 10:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/ 
economy/housing/2008-05-14-mortgage-foreclosures-mental-health_N.htm. 
85. Carey, supra note 83, at 265-66. 
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behind the mortgage is, that the mortgage is delinquent, or in some 
circumstances, that the debt exists at all.86  Some survivors may not 
know whether or not they even own a home.87  Others have been 
defrauded or coerced into signing a mortgage or signing over an interest 
in the home.88 
A lender’s loan modification requirements may be used by abusers 
to control their survivors.89  Abusers may attempt to use their required 
signature as leverage in other disputes or attempt to force the home into 
foreclosure in the belief that this will result in the survivor being 
homeless.  As reprehensible as this motive is, the peculiarities of the 
modification process make this an achievable goal for the abuser.  A 
survivor may be told, for example, that the loan could be modified to 
create an affordable payment if, and only if, the survivor reaches out to 
an abusive co-borrower to secure a signature.90  This can give an abuser 
a de facto veto over a survivor’s continued shelter.91 
2.   Spite 
The same types of behavior may also arise in cases of animosity 
between parties undergoing divorce or other separation where no 
violence is present.  Individuals attempting to force a home into 
foreclosure act against their own apparent interests and may be 
motivated by a desire to extend a system of coercive control—or may 
simply be motivated by run-of-the-mill spite.  The disjunct in the parties’ 
 
86. Littwin, supra note 59, at 994. 
87. Littwin, supra note 59, at 986. 
88. Littwin, supra note 59, at 993.  Advocates representing borrowers who may have 
signed a mortgage under duress or under fraudulent pretenses should remember that both 
fraud and coercion are defenses to an action to enforce a deed.  See, e.g., Brown v. Pierce, 74 
U.S. 205, 210 (1868) (fraud pled as a defense to a contract or deed is not limited by a statute 
of limitations in the same manner that fraud pled as a tort would be). 
89. See Littwin, supra note 59, at 953.  Littwin discusses the problem of coerced debt in 
a general consumer context.  The problem is particularly acute where the debt is mortgage 
debt and a failure to pay the debt could result in homelessness. 
90. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 5.7 (Requiring the signature of all 
borrowers except in narrow cases such as incapacity or contested divorce.  There is no listed 
exception for never-married co-borrowers where it is unsafe for one borrower to contact the 
other). 
91. This Article, to the extent possible, avoids gendered pronouns when discussing the 
perpetrators and victims of domestic violence.  Despite this effort, research has shown that the 
type of controlling violence at issue in such cases is, at least in heterosexual relationships, 
almost always perpetrated by men against women.  Michael P. Johnson, Conflict and Control: 
Gender Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
1003, 1003 (2006).  A failure to acknowledge this gross asymmetry would render any article 
on the subject incomplete.  Whether policies of mortgage servicers that disparately impact 
victims of domestic violence violate fair lending or fair housing laws is beyond the scope of 
this article. 
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goals may be a result of violence, could be a result of a mutual desire to 
hurt the other through whatever mechanism is available, or may be 
somewhere on a spectrum in between.  While borrowers acting out a 
mutual desire to harm each other may be a less compelling social 
concern than the systems of violent abuse and control discussed above, it 
is owed no deference by policymakers.  Spite is not a legally protected 
interest. 
III.  COMMON PROBLEMS AND PARTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Conflicts between parties with shared interests are hardly unique to 
the world of homeowners facing foreclosure.  There are, however, 
certain aspects of the lending and foreclosure process that make them 
particularly challenging to resolve. 
A. Lack of Resources and Representation 
Borrowers facing financial hardship frequently will not have an 
attorney to assist in a probate or family law matter.  If a parent dies with 
no assets other than an over-secured home, the children may not probate 
the estate promptly.  A divorcing couple representing themselves may 
not have an attorney assist with the drafting of a final agreement.  Even 
where a legal services attorney may help with a divorce or a home 
preservation case, there will often not be full representation in both 
matters.  Some legal services programs, for example, have much lower 
income caps for divorce cases than for home preservation cases.  Even 
where income permits representation in multiple cases, legal aid 
programs are unlikely to be able to help all eligible applicants.  Many 
areas do not have legal assistance attorneys who are adequately trained 
in foreclosure law.92 
For the borrowers in non-judicial foreclosure states this problem is 
complicated further.  In a judicial foreclosure, a homeowner receives a 
summons and complaint directing them to take specific action in court.93  
In a non-judicial foreclosure, the borrower may receive different types of 
notice, but does not appear in a judicial proceeding unless they can 
 
92. Frank S. Alexander, Dan Immergluck, Katie Balthrop, Philip Schaeffing & Jesse 
Clark, Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 360 (2011) (discussing uneven distribution of legal assistance 
attorneys trained in foreclosure law and a resistance to providing funding to alleviate the 
shortfall).  But cf. Attorney General’s HomeCorps: Borrower Representation Initiative, 
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF MASS., http://www.mass.gov/ago/about-the-attorn 
ey-generals-office/community-programs/ago-grants/homecorps-borrower-representation-initi 
ative.html (last visited May 13, 2014). 
93. Alexander, Immergluck, Balthrop, Schaeffing & Clark, supra note 92, at 343. 
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manage to bring the suit themselves.94  This can be particularly difficult 
for unrepresented borrowers.  Even though most mortgages require an 
entity seeking to foreclose to notify the borrower of the right to bring a 
court action to challenge an alleged default “or any other defense of 
Borrower to acceleration and sale,”95 it is not always clear what that 
cause of action is. 
A subset of problems with the availability of representation arises 
where there is a conflict of interest between co-owners.96  If a legal aid 
attorney is representing the homeowners and their interests diverge, there 
may be no attorney available to help either party. 
B. Three Timelines, Three Decision-Makers 
One problem that has plagued foreclosure prevention efforts is the 
practice of dual tracking where servicers will proceed with foreclosure 
while loss-mitigation efforts are pending.97  This leads to two problems.  
First, costs related to the foreclosure process accumulate while the loss-
mitigation process is pending.  Second, if the foreclosure process ends 
first, the loss-mitigation efforts cannot be completed.  Due to shorter 
time frames in non-judicial foreclosure states,98 this is a bigger problem.  
Under the National Mortgage Settlement, dual tracking should no longer 
occur.99  This resolves some of the timeline problems.  However, the 
problem remains that the decision on whether a contested foreclosure 
can legally proceed and whether a loan can be modified happens in an 
entirely separate forum.  Additionally, a home defense case may have 
judicially-established timelines.  A bankruptcy court, for example, might 
wish to close a case before a final decision can be made by the lender 
regarding loss-mitigation. 
This problem becomes even more complicated if there are legal 
proceedings adjudicating the interests of the borrowers.  In a contested 
divorce, a judge may not be willing to wait six months while the parties 
explore a loan modification with the lender.  Dividing property 
 
94. Alexander, Immergluck, Balthrop, Schaeffing & Clark, supra note 92, at 343.  
95. See FREDDIE MAC, supra note 9, at ¶ 22 
96. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56 (discussing particular 
concerns where a firm that assisted in a foreclosure prevention case could later be prevented 
from assisting in a domestic violence case). 
97. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of America Corp., Settlement Term Sheet, Case 
1:12-cv-00361-RMC, A-17 (D.C. Dist., 2012), available at https://www.mortgageoversight.co 
m/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Servicing-Standards.pdf (last visited May 13, 2014). 
98. Alexander et al., supra note 92, at 344. 
99. United States v. Bank of America Corp, Settlement Term Sheet, Case 1:12-cv-
00361-RMC, A-17 (D.C. Dist., 2012), available at https://www.mortgageoversight.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Servicing-Standards.pdf (last visited May 13, 2014). 
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encumbered by a mortgage requires knowledge of the terms of the 
mortgage and whether and under what terms they are likely to be 
modified.  At the same time, a lender may not be willing to allow a loan 
modification until the divorce is complete or to stay foreclosure 
proceedings while a divorce or probate matter is resolved. 
C. Notice and Privacy Problems 
A joint mortgagee, with or without the cooperation of the other 
mortgagee, has a right to keep the mortgage current by paying the 
monthly mortgage payments or to redeem the property by paying the 
entire amount due.  Most mortgages also provide a right to cure or 
reinstate a mortgage by tendering any past due payments, even after 
acceleration.100  Exercising this right requires that the borrower know 
how much is owed.  Various practices of lenders can interfere with this. 
First, most mortgages have a clause stating that all notices must be 
sent to only a single designated address.101  If two borrowers are living 
separately, there is no provision that would allow them to each receive 
notices.  In domestic abuse cases, this has resulted in an abuser having 
notices forwarded to a postal office box to conceal the fact that the 
mortgage was not paid.  This could be done both by making the request 
of the servicer or by filing a change of address with the post office. 
In an age where electronic notice can be sent at virtually no cost, 
such clauses are an anachronism.  Nor would providing a second notice 
to a joint account holder be out of line with existing law.  Federal 
privacy law, for example, permits institutions to provide joint account 
holders with a single copy of a privacy notice unless one or more 
borrowers requests separate notices.102  Adding similar language to an 
amendment to the Mortgage Servicing Rules under the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X)103 could effectively resolve 
this issue. 
Lenders have also cited privacy laws when prohibiting disclosures 
of any information regarding the account—even to those with a 
legitimate interest in paying the mortgage.  The broad reading of privacy 
 
100. See Freddie Mac, supra note 9, at ¶ 15. 
101. See Freddie Mac, supra note 9, at ¶ 15 (“There may be only one designated notice 
address under this Security Instrument at any one time.”); see also Nelson, supra note 13, at 
601 (discussing efforts to standardize mortgage law through the use of uniform instruments.  
Presently, the vast majority of home mortgages either use a Fannie/Freddie Uniform 
instrument or a substantially similar document). 
102. 16 C.F.R. § 313.19(g). 
103. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Docket No. CFPB-2012-0033, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-
2012-0033-0019. 
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laws may be part of an effort to set one policy that complies with the 
financial privacy laws of all fifty states.104  This has caused particular 
problems where the borrower who had been primarily responsible for 
paying the mortgage dies.  If a spouse or child inherits the property, the 
lender may refuse to communicate with the child or require a lengthy 
assumption process before communicating.  If the loan account is 
already delinquent, this delay could turn a solvable problem into an 
impossible one. 
Finally, the insistence on treating borrowers as a unified entity 
interferes when one borrower does not wish to be contacted pursuant to 
the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act105 and the other borrower 
seeks to communicate regarding the status of an account.  While the 
Ninth Circuit has held that borrowers may waive the rights created by a 
cease communication directive sent pursuant to section 1692c(c) of the 
Federal Debt Collection Practices Act,106 little or nothing has been 
written on how a debt collector should proceed when one co-debtor asks 
the collector to cease communication and the other co-debtor seeks 
communication for the purpose of resolving a delinquency. 
These problems could be easily resolved with only minor changes 
in lender procedures.  First, permitting multiple notice addresses is a 
simple action that could prevent many communication problems.  With 
the consent of a borrower, having notices sent to multiple addresses 
could also be helpful for homeowners who for reasons related to 
capacity or infirmity periodically have trouble promptly responding to 
bills in a timely fashion but have friends or family members who are 
able to assist them.  Similarly, servicers should have clear policies 
stating that all mortgagors are entitled to an accounting of the mortgage, 
whether or not they are personally liable on the loan.  Where servicers 
are unable or unwilling to voluntarily adopt policies that both protect 
borrower privacy and allow homeowners to know the status of their 
account,107 regulators should consider amending servicing regulations. 
 
104. See Andrea Lee Negroni & John P. Kromer, Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Tip of the 
Privacy Iceberg, 118 BANKING L. J. 958, 967 (2001) (encouraging financial institutions to 
incorporate a periodic review and update of state privacy laws in their compliance program). 
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2006). 
106. Id.; Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
107. Cf. Littwin, supra note 59, at 978 (citing concerns that current, impersonal systems 
have permitted identity theft by intimate associates while preventing borrowers from finding 
the correct person to speak to about the loan). 
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D.  There Are Rarely Concerns About Recourse 
A foreclosure alternative that allows one borrower to avoid future 
liability on the loan could, in theory, limit a bank’s ability to collect a 
judgment for any deficiency if the home was ultimately foreclosed.  In 
practice, deficiency judgments are rarely pursued.  Many states, by law, 
protect or limit deficiency judgments following foreclosure.108  Even 
where pursuit of a deficiency is legal, it is rarely pursued.   The flagship 
HAMP program explicitly permits modification where one or more 
borrowers has effectively transformed a mortgage loan into a non-
recourse loan through a Chapter 7 filing.109  So long as any owner being 
removed from the loan is not contributing income to the household, 
concerns about removing one borrower from the obligation are unlikely 
to substantially affect a lender’s bottom line.110  For a prudently 
underwritten loan, a lender’s security in the event of default is the 
property—not the other assets of a questionably-solvent co-obligor. 
IV.  POSSIBLE WAYS TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS 
The problems discussed above are all species of the same, more 
general problem.  Two mortgagors and one mortgagee are three parties 
with three sets of interests—not two.  While the mortgagors often have 
aligning interests, this is not always the case.  This problem becomes 
more difficult to resolve when the primary interests of the parties are 
fundamentally divergent in nature.  The lender’s interest is primarily 
financial.  One owner might be primarily interested in retaining the home 
as shelter.  A co-owner’s interests could be financial or could be 
something else entirely—such as ensuring that the first owner doesn’t 
get to keep the house.  The matter cannot be fruitfully negotiated unless 
one party is somehow removed or the three parties are brought together 
at a common table with a referee.  Pretending that co-owners with 
divergent interests can or should act with one voice does not solve the 
problem. 
 
108. Ron Harris & Asher Meir, Non-Recourse Mortgages—a Fresh Start, 21 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 119, 124 (2013). 
109. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 8.5. 
110. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 5.7 (requiring the signature of all 
original borrowers on documents, except in cases where a borrower is deceased or divorced, 
including the Request for Modification Affidavit that includes documentation of income).  
Because the HAMP guidelines provide this protection for formerly married borrowers 
following divorce, they may also be required to provide similar protections for never-married 
borrowers following a similar life change.  See Foreclosures and Domestic Violence 
Survivors, supra note 56. 
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A. Can One Homeowner Be Removed? 
1.  Legal Options 
An order in a domestic relations case can transfer ownership of the 
property and responsibility for making payments on the loan.111  In some 
circumstances, a suit for partition might allow one owner to remove a 
joint owner—provided the interests of the other owner can adequately be 
protected.112  A mortgage may not be accelerated based solely on a 
transfer from one spouse to another.113  If borrowers are unmarried, the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, in conjunction with the Garn St. Germain 
Act, may prohibit acceleration where a transfer would have been 
protected had the borrowers been married.114  If a non-occupying co-
borrower has relinquished the property through a quitclaim, HAMP and 
similar programs permit modification of the loan.115 
Absent an order transferring ownership, one borrower may be able 
to obtain a power of attorney from the other borrower—either 
voluntarily or by order of the court—authorizing the first borrower to 
execute any documents related to the home.  In cases in which one 
borrower is deliberately trying to sabotage loss-mitigation efforts, this 
could prevent the borrower seeking a workout from having to return to 
court for a contempt order each time the servicer sought additional 
documents. 
 2.  Refinance, Redemption, and Repurchase 
A property owner may redeem a mortgaged property by paying the 
entire amount due on the mortgage prior to foreclosure.116  In the rare 
case where an owner, or somebody willing to help the owner, has 
adequate cash reserves to redeem the mortgage, the owner could simply 
do so.  In cases where the current owner was not personally obligated on 
the original loan, reports of delinquent payments would not cause 
damage to the owner’s credit score.  A refinance may also be a viable 
option.  In some cases, lenders have been willing to accept a “short 
payoff” where the owner tenders less than the amount the lender believes 
 
111. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 16. 
112. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 16. 
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j–3 (2006). 
114. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 16. 
115. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 1.2. 
116. James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different View of 
Mortgage Antideficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 137 (1997). 
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is due and the lender releases the lien.117 
A refinance for less than the amount originally due is, in rare 
circumstances, an option.  Although a lender may be understandably 
reluctant to underwrite a new loan to a borrower already at risk of 
foreclosure, lenders may be willing to do so as a loss-mitigation measure 
on an existing portfolio loan.118  This could be structured as a principal 
write-down on the original loan followed by a refinance or as a full 
refinance coupled with an immediate principal write-down. 
Depending on state law, borrowers may have a right to purchase a 
property at a foreclosure sale.  In practice, this would need to be a cash 
purchase because lenders typically will not underwrite loans without a 
title insurance policy119 and no title insurer is likely to insure a loan to 
purchase a property at a foreclosure auction.120  In practice this means 
that the only bidders at foreclosure auctions tend to be lenders or 
investors.121  There is, however, no reason that a lender could not, prior 
to the auction, agree to guarantee to finance a bid up to a certain amount 
for a borrower.122  For example, a foreclosing lender could offer to 
extend a new loan to a homeowner in an amount comparable to the 
present value of the home.  While there is some risk that a third party (or 
even the other owner) would show up and enter a higher bid, this could 
effectively lead to title vested in one owner, securing a loan with an 
affordable payment.  Because any other owner, claimant, or lienholder 
would have notice and an opportunity to show up at sale and enter a 
higher bid, concerns about collusion between the purchasing homeowner 
and the foreclosing party are minimized. 
 
117. See, e.g., Mortgagee Letter 09-52, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. 
(April 2, 2014, 8:57 PM), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=09-52ml.pdf. 
118. A portfolio loan is a loan in which the debt is owned by the current servicer.  
Portfolio loans may have more workout options because the servicer is not bound by contracts 
with a third party investor.  Brian S. Weinhart & Todd M. Moore, Understanding 
Modification Options Under Portfolio and CMBS Loan Structures, 8 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & 
REG. REP. 1, 1 (2009) (discussing workouts in the context of commercial loans). 
119. Ron Lieber, After Foreclosure, a Focus on Title Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/your-money/mortgages/09money.html (last visited 
May 13, 2014). 
120. Mike Giusti, Fantasizing About Foreclosure? Novice Investors Beware, MSN 
REAL ESTATE, http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107739 (last visited 
May 13, 2014). 
121. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform 
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1420 (2004).  Nelson and Whitman cite the 
requirement to provide a substantial down payment in good funds as a primary barrier. 
122. Id. at 1419. 
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B. Coordination of Timelines 
Unnecessary foreclosure can also be avoided by ensuring that 
timelines for resolving title to the house are coordinated with foreclosure 
timelines.  If resolving ownership of a house requires a probate process 
or divorce process to run its course, courts, advocates, and lenders can 
push to ensure that the respective processes proceed in a manner that 
preserves as many options as possible.  For lenders, this could simply 
mean delaying foreclosure while another legal proceeding occurs.  
Alternatively, lenders could grant a provisional modification contingent 
upon a homeowner providing, for example, a copy of a divorce decree 
awarding title to the home.  This could allow a lender to transform a 
delinquent account into a performing account while other proceedings 
are pending. 
 It might be objected that efforts to synchronize timelines of the 
various decision makers result in a de facto adoption of the slowest 
timeline.  If delay in a probate or divorce proceeding prevents 
foreclosure, a homeowner could have an incentive to draw out the 
proceedings for as long as possible.  This may be a particularly 
compelling objection in light of existing concerns by some 
commentators that foreclosure timelines already take too long.123  More 
recent scholarship, however, has raised concerns that a rush to 
foreclosure has stood in the way of finding alternatives to foreclosure.124  
Ultimately the foreclosure process, like every other legal process, takes 
as long as it takes.  A mortgage lender need not be entitled to a faster 
recovery than any other litigant at the expense of the homeowner.  
Delays related to long dockets and understaffed courthouses affect all 
litigants.  In practice, many of the delays are caused by a lender’s 
inability to review documents125 or respond to discovery requests in the 
allotted time frames. 
Many of these problems regarding timelines are resolved in judicial 
foreclosure states, where foreclosure requires an action to be brought 
against a homeowner or the representative of an estate.126  Courts 
 
123. Nelson, supra note 13, at 586.  
124. Dewar, supra note 36, at 187. 
125. Kulp & Shack, supra note 6, at 219 (citing lender’s failure to request, expectation 
of documents in unconventional and counter-intuitive forms, and provision of inaccurate or 
contradictory directions to borrowers as a primary cause for delays or denials of loan 
modifications).  This article addressed cases where a third party was assisting in the workout 
process and providing some level of supervision to the lender.  Presumably the normal 
absence of any oversight would result in similar or worse problems. 
126. See, e.g., ABN AMRO Mortg. Group, Inc. v. McGahan, 931 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 
(Ill. 2010) (requiring that a foreclosure suit be bought against the estate of a deceased 
borrower rather than against the home itself); see also Michael W. Zientz, Why Deceased 
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overseeing foreclosure cases have the power to stay the case to permit 
other courts or other proceedings a reasonable time to reach a 
conclusion. 
V. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE CAN BRING COMPETING INTERESTS INTO 
THE SAME COURT 
While all of the proposals above might resolve specific cases, they 
are all imperfect in that they do not accomplish the goal of getting all the 
parties with all their diverse interests into the same room with a neutral 
adjudicator with the power to determine ownership of the property.  The 
way to do this is judicial foreclosure.127  This process is necessary to 
protect the substantive and procedural rights of homeowners.128  Courts 
have long been equipped to deal with litigation involving numerous 
parties with divergent interests, including parties that may not be present 
in the action at issue.129 
Traditionally, all owners and obligors would be named parties in a 
foreclosure proceeding.130  With all interested parties in court,131 the 
entirety of any title suit may be resolved.  Parties in disagreement can 
further avail themselves of existing alternative dispute resolution options 
courts may have established. 
It is particularly important that courts have the ability to hear the 
entirety of a dispute or the authority to stay the matter while the 
 
Borrowers Cause Title Problems in Texas, USFN (2006), available at 
http://www.usfn.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=USFN_E_Update&Template=/CM/HTMLD
isplay.cfm &ContentID=2746 (describing a similar process in Texas from an industry 
perspective). 
127. Judicial foreclosure is far and away the most effective approach to the problems 
outlined in this Article and the most challenging to implement.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart, 
Toward a More Equitable Balance: Homeowner and Purchaser Tensions in Non-Judicial 
Foreclosure States, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 562, 585 (2012); see also Alexander et. al, 
supra note 91, at 349 (stating that while pushing for judicial foreclosure would seem desirable 
from a borrower’s perspective, it might be more politically viable to push for incremental 
change). 
128. But cf. Nelson, supra note 13, at 587 (lambasting the irregular patterns of state 
laws designed to protect and preserve the due process rights of homeowners faced with the 
loss of the property that is likely both their largest asset and their sole source of shelter as 
“quaint”). 
129. Andrew J. Kazakes, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The 
Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1383, 1415 (2010) (discussing state courts’ ability to represent the interests of both absent 
investors and absent community members). 
130. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark & Herbert Brownell, Jr., Joinder of Parties, 37 YALE 
L.J. 28, 41 (1927). 
131. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 121, at 1403 (noting that a typical judicial 
foreclosure process requires service of all parties whose interests may ultimately be prejudiced 
by the foreclosure). 
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remainder of the dispute is litigated in another forum.132  Determinations 
limited to default or non-default are insufficient to fully protect the rights 
of borrowers.133  Unrestricted jurisdiction is necessary to avoid a 
multiplicity of suits.134  Similar efficiencies occur in Chapter 13 
adversary proceedings. 
A judicial foreclosure also has a finality that a non-judicial 
foreclosure does not have.135  A judicial foreclosure bars a subsequent 
unraveling of the sale through the doctrine of res judicata.136  This is 
particularly important in cases where joint owners have a disagreement 
regarding the status of the property.  Where one homeowner does not 
want to own a distressed home, few things would be more frustrating 
than having a co-borrower successfully challenge and unravel the sale.  
A judgment in a judicial foreclosure, including a default judgment, could 
permit one owner to effectively and permanently relinquish any right to 
the property. 
Opponents of judicial foreclosure often cite costs and efficiency 
concerns.  These concerns may be overstated.  Because a non-judicial 
foreclosure state does not require a judicial determination prior to 
foreclosure,137 foreclosures in those states do not have the finality a 
judicial determination could bring.  Massachusetts, for example, is a 
non-judicial foreclosure state, which permits foreclosure pursuant to a 
statutory power of sale.138  However, Massachusetts practice usually 
includes a limited suit to determine whether a party is entitled to the 
protections of the Sailor and Service Members Civil Relief Act 
(SCRA).139  Although this is generally an abbreviated suit140 where 
defendants who are not entitled to SCRA protections lack any standing, 
it requires filing, service, and delays connected with both court dockets 
and the answer period.  This is particularly confusing to pro se 
 
132. Advocates may consider counterclaim to try title or a cross-claim for partition in 
cases where it may be necessary for a court to reach a determination on title other than an 
order permitting foreclosure. 
133. Timothy J. Peterkin, Getting to the Arguments: How Legitimate Defenses to 
Foreclosure Are Raised, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 253, 264 (2012) (discussing circumstances 
where a mortgage was entered by a party with a clear inability to contract who could not assert 
fraud or incapacity in a North Carolina hearing before a clerk). 
134. See, e.g., id. at 274 (discussing cases where homeowners would simultaneously 
defend a legal action to stop a foreclosure sale and prosecute an equitable suit to enjoin the 
sale with no possibility of joining the two cases). 
135. Renuart, supra note 125, at 563. 
136. Renuart, supra note 125, at 565. 
137. Alexander et al., supra note 91, at 345. 
138. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 21 (2004 & supp. 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, 
§ 14 (2004 & supp. 2013). 
139. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt, 981 N.E.2d 710, 713-14 (Mass. 2013). 
140. Id. 
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homeowners who attempt to answer the suit, are told they lack standing, 
and do not know where to turn.  Following this abbreviated process, 
non-judicial foreclosure is permitted.  However, evicting a former 
homeowner after foreclosure requires a second judicial proceeding.141  
Homeowners or former homeowners have the opportunity to challenge 
the validity of the sale in this action.142  In practice this means that the 
same matters are litigated—but a homeowner prevails only on the matter 
of possession.143  Quieting title requires a third suit in a different court.144  
If the foreclosing party is different than the plaintiff in an eviction suit,145 
settlement can be inhibited. 
A Chapter 13 Bankruptcy may be an option for homeowners who 
can afford a Chapter 13 plan.  Because this stays collection proceedings, 
it could effectively bring all parties into the same suit.146 
CONCLUSION 
The world of lending, securitization, servicing, and foreclosure 
involve a vast array of entities, frequent internal conflicts, and a level of 
opacity most consumers cannot penetrate.  A house is a real-world 
physical asset with a value that extends far beyond its mere appraised 
value.  In part because of this, individuals who own or claim to own the 
same home may have varying and conflicting interests.  In short, a 
foreclosure is a variety of title dispute between entities that are far more 
complicated than a unified mortgagee and a unified mortgagor. 
Because the stakes are so high for the owners, it is imperative that 
these conflicts be resolved through a process that respects the rights of 
all involved.  This requires paying careful attention to both 
communications and timelines to avoid conflict or avoidable loss.  
Ultimately, the stakes and complexity of the interests involved should be 
handled judicially, by an institution that has long been equipped to 
handle high stakes, complicated conflicts. 
 
 
141. MASS. GEN. LAWS  ch. 239 (2004 & supp. 2013). 
142. Bank of New York v. Bailey, 951 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Mass. 2011). 
143.  MASS. GEN. LAWS  ch. 239, § 7 (2004 & supp. 2013) (stating, “[t]he judgment in 
an action under this chapter shall not be a bar to any action thereafter brought by either party 
to recover the land or tenements in question . . . .”). 
144. Id. 
145. See, e.g., FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 2012 SERVICING GUIDE 801-34 (2012), 
available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc031412.pdf (directing servicers to 
retain attorneys to conduct proceedings in the servicer’s name but vest title in Fannie Mae’s 
name through an assignment of the bid) (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
146. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 15-16. 
